Bank of India, IOB report NPA divergences; losses widen for FY19


State-owned Bank of India and Indian Overseas Bank have reported divergences in their bad loans for the fiscal ended March 2019, resulting into widening of net losses for the year.

Chennai-headquartered Indian Overseas Bank has reported a net non-performing asset (NPA) divergence of Rs 358 crore for 2018-19, due to which the divergence in provisioning came in at Rs 2,208 crore, according to a regulatory filing by the bank.

The bank has an adjusted loss of Rs 5,999.88 crore in the fiscal ended March 2019, higher than Rs 3,737.88 crore reported earlier, due to the divergence.

Banks have to report the divergence in asset classification and provisioning for NPAs as per Risk Assessment Report of RBI subject to certain conditions, which is the gap between the bad loans as declared by the lenders and that assessed by the regulator.

Bank of India on the other hand had a fall in its net NPA divergence by Rs 329 crore for 2018-19, because the NPAs reported by the bank were higher than that assessed by the RBI.

However, the lender's net loss for the year expanded to Rs 6,992.90 crore from Rs 5,546.90 crore reported by the bank due to divergence in provisioning requirement.

The bank's divergence in provisioning for the year was at Rs 1,446 crore, Bank of India said in the regulatory filing.

Earlier this month, market regulator Sebi had put in place tighter disclosure norms, and directed all listed banks to disclose any divergence in bad loan provisioning within 24 hours of receiving RBI's risk assessment report, rather than waiting to publish the details in their annual financial statements.

Some banks, including Indian Bank, Union Bank of India and Lakshmi Vilas Bank, have already reported their NPA divergences for last fiscal.

The disclosures need to be made in case the banks' additional provisioning for non-performing assets (NPAs) assessed by the RBI exceeds 10 per cent of the reported profit before provisions and contingencies, and if the additional gross NPAs identified by the RBI exceed 15 per cent of the published incremental gross NPAs.

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The Co-op bank crisis: How 1,500+ urban cooperative banks are being run and regulated


The lender, with deposits in excess of Rs 11,000 crore, appears not to have adequately reported the size of its non-performing assets

Last Friday, no one turned up to deliver milk at Avillion Greenfields, a cooperative housing society in Mumbai. The delivery boys were apparently unable to withdraw enough cash from their bank to buy milk supplies.

Their savings are currently stuck at Punjab & Maharashtra Cooperative (PMC) Bank, which has been put under restrictions by the Reserve Bank of India for refusing to recognise its bad loan situation. Withdrawals from bank accounts have been restricted.

It’s not just the milk boys. Raju Agarwal, civil contractor who lives in Avillion Greenfields, has fixed deposits of nearly Rs 50 lakh in the same urban cooperative Bank. Even the two Avillion Greenfields housing societies at Jogeshwari East together have deposits of nearly Rs 3.5-crore in the crisis-hit lender. “Nearly 200 residents in our complex have deposited money in PMC Bank. And for the last few days, there has been a pall of gloom all around,” Agarwal, 57, tells ET Magazine.

The lender, with deposits in excess of Rs 11,000 crore, appears not to have adequately reported the size of its non-performing assets, especially a Rs 2,500 crore exposure to real estate company HDIL Group, which has been taken to the bankruptcy courts by creditors.

Under Lens
The plight of PMC Bank depositors across Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, MP and Delhi and the impunity with which its officials flouted norms raises questions about management of all 1,500-odd urban cooperative banks with total deposits of nearly Rs 4.5 lakh crore.

Urban cooperative banks are divided into two tiers based on their area of operation. While only 31% of them are in tier-2 category, they account for more than 85% of deposits and advances.

Many small cooperative banks and cooperative societies also keep their deposits in large urban cooperative banks. Agarwal says the urban cooperative banks often offer slightly higher interest rates than state-run banks and aggressively seek deposits from housing societies.

“The biggest worry is that this [crisis at PMC Bank] can have a cascading effect,” says Arvind Khaladkar, who during his time as chairman of Pune-based Janata Sahakari Bank, was credited with turning around the cooperative lender.


He says nearly 130 smaller banks have deposits at PMC Bank, and if the lender is unable to return their money, all these small banks will have to mark their deposits as NPAs. “Cooperative banks operate on thin margins and this NPA will mean they will all be in loss, triggering a wider crisis,” the retired banker told ET Magazine.

Demand for Answers
Soon after the RBI appointed an administrator for PMC Bank last Tuesday, angry depositors gathered outside different branches to get their money out. By Thursday, RBI increased the cash withdrawal limit from Rs 1,000 to Rs 10,000.

Meanwhile, several first information reports have been filed against the bank’s top management. On Friday, even as the bank’s deposed managing director Joy Thomas held a press conference in Mumbai, assuring safety of deposits, many of the depositors met near a branch in Andheri to discuss how to bring the management and the board to book.

Lending Mistakes

While all the focus is now on PMC Bank, Khaladkar refers to a larger issue — of how cooperative banks struggle to invest the funds raised as deposits and end up extending risky loans. “At one time, PMC Bank had lower deposits than Janata Sahakari. But they overtook us. When you grow fast, you need to also deploy that cash fast. That is when mistakes happen.”

The bank’s books also show a sudden spurt in term deposits. While its term deposits grew by 11.6% in FY17 and 10.96% in FY18, in FY19, the deposits jumped by 18.9%, crossing Rs 9,325 crore. Thus, the real growth in FY19 was double that of FY18. In this period, the bank’s total deposits grew by 16.89% to Rs 11,617 crore.

Former BJP MP Kirit Somaiya, who first registered a police case against PMC Bank and also met RBI deputy governor NS Vishwanathan over the issue, says: “This is a horrible situation — a clear financial fraud. The main borrower of PMC, HDIL, is already insolvent. There has to be an immediate relief for depositors and rehabilitation for the bank.”

Urban cooperative banks are caught in a time warp, he says. “They have assets like branch networks, but today when banks are going fully online, what is the value of the branches?”

The PMC Bank crisis has also broken out at a time when most cooperative banks and cooperative housing societies are rushing to hold their annual general meetings (AGM) before the September 30 deadline.

Though the AGM of PMC Bank has been postponed amid the ongoing crisis, fireworks are likely at meetings of other urban cooperative banks.

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Five PSU banks have over 70% NPA from industry in FY19


The non-performing assets (NPAs) in the industry sector accounted for over 50 per cent of the total bad debts in 18 of the 20 state-run banks in 2018-19, indicating the massive concentration risk still facing the banking sector.

Five state-run banks reported that bad debts from industry contributed more than 70 per cent of their total NPAs, according to Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data presented by the Finance Ministry to the Lok Sabha Monday.

Alarmingly, of these five banks, four are relatively smaller ones.

Andhra Bank had the highest share of industry bad debts at 86 per cent, followed by United Bank of India (UBI) at 78 per cent and Indian Bank at 74 per cent.

The country’s largest bank, State Bank of India (SBI) had 73 per cent of its bad debts from the industry sector, followed by Allahabad Bank at 70 per cent.

Only two banks saw the share of industry NPAs at less than 50 per cent — Syndicate Bank and Bank of India at 36 per cent and 49 per cent, respectively.

Industry issue
Basic metals and metal products, gems and jewellery, engineering, vehicles, construction and textiles have been the major groups within industry seeing high levels of stress, RBI had pointed out in its December 2018 report of trends and progress in banking in India.

In 2017-18, even though industry received 37.3 per cent of total loans and advances by all the banks, it contributed to about three-fourth of the total NPAs.

However, with resolution under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) picking up pace in 2018-19, industry NPAs have been coming down and banks have been making better recoveries.

The gross NPAs of state-run banks as of March 2019 was at Rs 8.06 lakh crore, as against Rs 8.95 lakh crore in the year-ago period.

Steps taken to resolve bad debts
The Modi government has announced many steps over the last few years to tackle the burgeoning bad debt problem. These include enactment of the IBC, amendments to the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, staffing the debt recovery tribunals, and asking banks to crack down on defaulters.

However, despite all these steps, resolution of bad debts has been a slow process, forcing the Modi government to go in for a massive bank capitalisation drive to ensure that state-run banks do not breach any regulatory capital requirements.

The government has also accelerated the bank consolidation drive by merging a big banks with smaller, lesser-performing ones to create a large competitive entity. The government merged State Bank of India with its associate banks and followed it with the merger of Bank of Baroda, Vijaya Bank and Dena Bank.
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Crisis in Public Sector Banks - What is the Responsibility of the Government as the Owner?

The government-owned, or public sector banks (PSBs), which are under severe stress, require an urgent surgical strike. Bulging non-performing assets (NPAs), increasing frauds, and declining credit to the key sectors is worrying. Moneylife has laid bare many of the frauds and misdemeanors of the commercial banks that included Syndicate Bank (2014), Bank of Baroda (2015), Punjab National Bank (2017), to mention a key few. The free ride of businessmen started eroding confidence in banks due to questionable lending practices in PSBs.

 The rot goes deep. For example, what are the answers to these questions?

1. All limits above Rs5bn should be sanctioned by the board duly overseen by the risk management committee. Banks also have internal audits, statutory audits and financial inspection of banks by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) annually. Then how were such limits sanctioned without due diligence of directors on the boards of top-12 defaulting companies referred to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in 2017? What role did various committees play during the currency of the loan?

2. Even after the roles of managing director (MD) and chairman are separated, why couldn’t the non-executive chairman provide the required guidance to the board in enforcing accountability and transparency?

3. Why did the banks fail in due diligence of directors of the companies to which they sanctioned loans? It was noticed in several cases that the directors held suspicious transactions with other boards or companies but did not go on record as such. Integrity of the borrowers was taken for granted, going by the way banks nurtured the accounts.

4. Why and how were the banks allowed to hold the accounts with recovery actions far beyond 90 days in regard to all the major corporate advances?

5. When the RBI is represented on the board and with data on non-performing assets (NPAs) and corporate advances and the analytics of the financial stability reports coming out every quarter, why could it not contain the contagion of NPAs?

6. Why couldn’t the RBI director on the board insist on the audit committee to steer clear of acts that led to prompt corrective action (PCA)?

7. All the banks are subject to risk based supervision by the RBI. Then how could the banks manage such supervision and yet hide the processes that led to the frauds that surfaced later?

8. What is the role played by the nominee director of government of India in the board approvals and the NPA status of the bank concerned? 

9. Did the board of any bank give a strategic direction to the MD and monitor such direction subsequently?

10. When government of India (GoI) directed merger of associate banks with State Bank of India (SBI) or later the merger of two other PSBs with Bank of Baroda, fait accompli, the boards passed a resolution favoring the mergers and the consequences and the impacts on customers and other stakeholders were hardly discussed and there were also no voices of either concern or dissent. The role played by independent directors becomes significant in such situations. 

Clearly PSBs are facing a huge governance deficit. Time to time, volumes involved in frauds have only increased, notwithstanding the existence of internal chief vigilance officer, external vigilance commission, system audit, risk audit, stock audit, concurrent audit, and annual internal inspections by the banks’ own audit team, external statutory audit, forensic audit and the annual audit of the bank by the RBI approved chartered accountant firm. PNB fraudsters successfully hoodwinked all of them. 

The question is: What is the role of the owner, regulator and controller of PSBs? The government has announced recapitalisation to the extent of Rs211,000 crore to meet the regulatory capital requirement once Basel III becomes operational (Basel III implementation date has since been extended to April 2019 from April 2018).

The present finance minister, sailing with the wind, again provided another Rs70,000 crore capitalisation in the next nine months.

Many experts feel that good (taxpayers’) money is flowing to the bad (crooks) with no accountability.

Although the government seemed to recognise the need for reforms, it fell short of introducing the structural changes suggested in the report. At the root of the rot lies poor governance and the absence of ethics. 

It is the boards that should make the difference between the most successful and the unsuccessful corporate, whether in banking or elsewhere. Managerial efficiency, risk management systems and efficient governance require urgent attention. 

The Financial Times had held a series of debates in 2013 on better boards and corporate governance. The strong message that emanates from the debates is that fewer rules and more significant consequences for breaking them would make a lot of sense. Further, it is not good to have one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance and the organisations should be empowered to craft their own systems of governance.

Narasimham Committee-1 made some significant recommendations regarding governance that would require a re-visit.

Ownership Issues

SBI has its chairman, MDs and deputy MDs (DMDs) as members of its board. PSB boards have been reconstituted in line with the recommendation of PJ Nayak committee with MD and non-executive chairman as two separate positions with both of them requiring the approval of the RBI. 

MD of PSBs are selected by banks board bureau (BBB) since 2015. BBB proved not so effective with long delays in filling the top positions of several banks and overbearing influence of ministry of finance (MoF) in the selection process. SBI post-merger and PSBs have individual shareholders who include even employees and retired employees of the banks as minority shareholders. This status involves the issue of protecting the interests of minority shareholders as well.  

Ownership, governance and regulation have created inconvenient compromises in the PSBs. The roles of owner and regulator combined in GoI have a built-in conflict. The presence of RBI in banks’ boards is further conflict of interest. The Narasimham Committee -1 recommended 25 years ago that RBI should dissociate itself from bank boards. This obvious step has still not been taken.

The role and functions of the ethics committee have not been well defined. The board should have full authority for appointment of statutory auditors with no role for the RBI. But going by the experience of the failures of banks such as the Global Trust Bank Ltd, RBI decided that the auditor firm should be from its approved list. 

The GoI has a strong lock on the banking sector but talks of competition in banks, independence and autonomy. It plants its officials from the finance ministry as directors on PSB boards. At best, these nominated directors carry the proceedings with their own interpretation to the ministry, and such interpretation may cause some unintended consequences to the banks they serve. 

How Do We Avoid Conflict of Interest?

A governance code could have guidelines for the management on its behaviour patterns because it is they who are running the institution and making the day-to-day decisions and their behaviour will be of greater consequence to the functioning of the bank than that of the board that meets at pre-determined intervals. The ‘comply and explain’ requirements should be very clear and unambiguous. Non-negotiable rules would lessen the complexity of corporate governance from the investors’ perspective. 

In India, unlike in some European two-tier boards and unlike in UK, the boards of PSBs, provide for employee representatives too on boards from the workers and officers.

Although several PSBs in the wake of financial sector reforms allotted shares to their employees it is not necessary that the workmen directors need be shareholders. Systems of governance should be focused on empowering front-line staff—rather than trying to keep them in check, even the  debates in Financial Times concluded.

Though stakeholders’ interests should weigh more than those of the shareholders, it is the lack of ownership culture among this set of non-executive directors (NEDs) that results in their performance below the expectations of the group they represent and that should cause worry. This constituency of stakeholder on the board needs careful treatment and nurturing. Employees and pensioners would be a growing constituency and they should have a place in the board as part of minority interests’ protection. 

Audits and Audit Committees

Banks that complain of multiple audits interfering with their business could not justify the concern due to the alarming rise in financial irregularities and poor credit risk management. Systems have become vulnerable to intrusions putting the banks to losses not seen before. Therefore, system audits have assumed critical importance. 

The complexities of the systems are on the increase with increasing role for them—both in operational and instructional matters. There is a growing trend of addressing any customer grievance only through an instruction embedded in the system. Almost all banks have been generating only e-circulars. The employees and managers hardly go through them save exceptions – those in the regional/zonal/head/central offices. The ability of the banks to put them to institutional learning periodically is also dwindling. Learning mechanisms seem to have been severely impaired. This leads to unnerving top management not generally admitted in public but discussed internally. The board has a responsibility through the HR (human resource) committee to resolve such a dilemma. 

Need for an Independent Director with knowledge of Technology 

The world over, technology risks and cyber risks are overcrowding the banks and financial institutions. Michael Bloch et al of McKinsey in their "Elevating Technology to the Boardroom Agenda Report (2012)" insists that the boards call for periodic reviews of technology’s long-term role in the industry by pushing the IT jargon the background and bringing in the right people to the board meetings for discussions on technology adoption. 

Leveraging technology savvy board members and strengthening technology governance structure by delegating the related risk issues to the board committee that oversees the risk management portfolio are some of the key suggestions worthy of consideration.

Good Governance Requires More Than Rule Fixes

Universal banking that permitted the banks to take to finance housing, real estate, retail loans, and sell third-party products, like insurance, mutual funds, pension funds etc, followed by digital banking, has made banking a non-core activity with overwhelming incentives for performing non-banking functions. 

Banks insure their own assets with the general insurance companies. Bank employees are expected to handle the banking products of deposit, credit and investments and not insurance and mutual fund products. 

Boards were silent spectators when the banks were measuring executive and employee performance based on the earnings on third-party products. 

During 2018, MoF directed the banks not to pass on any incentive for selling third-party products to any employee or executive and the benefit of such business should be accounted for in the profit of banks. Thereafter, PSBs started refocusing on banking business. Performance evaluation criteria should be overseen by the board. Boards, therefore, have a serious challenge in HR management oversight.

RBI should approve those directors on bank boards who are of impeccable integrity and unquestionable character, with no role conflict at any point of time.

The ‘fit and proper’ criteria prescribed by the RBI need revision. It is desirable that the selected person should be asked to give a two-page write up on his knowledge of the board functioning; his intended contribution, and his relationships with the other directors on the board and of his views on the present management, as a third eye from the published data and information, as obtaining with the Netherland banks. 

This statement can be reviewed by the regulators who may even seek clarifications where necessary before confirming the appointment. Knowledge and culture are two different aspects though synchronisation would enhance the value of the person. Such a write-up from the prospective director, therefore, can help in self-assessment of the director and performance assessment of the board itself eventually.

The annual general meetings (AGM) should not end up as the presentation of the audited statement of accounts to the general body; it should have group discussions of the shareholders on wide ranging issues like the strategies, risk appetite and risk culture in the organisation. In the alternative, it is also worthwhile to have board retreats for two days annually for self-evaluation and the way forward prior to the AGM and have at the AGM a synopsis of the discussions in the retreats,  as a guide for future.

It is the banks that could alone answer these questions as board documents are confidential. The best way to prevent such transactions is to strengthen corporate governance by the regulators/supervisors at once disassociating themselves from being on the boards of all categories of banks.

Source- Moneylife
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Why bad loans of public sector banks are down by 10%


1) Why is a 10% fall in bad loans significant?

Bad loans are largely loans that haven’t been repaid for 90 days or more. For the first time in years, bad loans of public sector banks have shrunk year-on-year. For years, they did not recognize bad loans, and postponed recognition by restructuring loans and also by evergreening. It was only in 2013-2014 that these banks started recognizing a few bad loans. This changed further in mid-2015, when RBI launched an asset quality review, following it up with other schemes that forced banks to recognize bad loans. That is why bad loans jumped from ₹2.27 trillion to ₹8.96 trillion between March 2014 and March 2018.

2) Why have bad loans shrunk between March 2018 and March 2019?

Loans that have been bad for four years are dropped from the balance sheet of banks by way of a write-off. This is referred to as a technical write-off and is basically an accounting practice. The central bank defines technical write-offs as bad loans that have been written off at the head office level of the bank but remain as bad loans on the books of branches and, hence, recovery efforts continue at the branch level. A lot of technical write-offs has happened between March 2018 and March 2019, leading to bad loans coming down during that period.

3) What does this mean?

As mentioned earlier, public sector banks started recognizing bad loans nearly four-five years back. In 2018-19, bad loans that had been on the balance sheets of banks for more than four years were automatically written off. The total amount of bad loans written off in 2018-19 was nearly ₹1.97 trillion. Also, the fresh bad loans recognized during the course of the year came down by 45%. This explains why the bad loans of public sector banks have come down. Time is acting as a healer. Primarily, the bad loans have been written off. Over and above this, the recognition of fresh bad loans has come down, which is good news.

4) What about the recovery of bad loans that have been written off?

Given the definition of a technical write-off, loans can be recovered even after they have been written off. Between April 2014 and March 2018, the total amount of loans written off by public sector banks was around₹3.17 trillion. Of this, around 14% was recovered previously. This doesn’t sound good. Hence, a loan, once written off, is as good as one waived off.

5) What’s the big-picture implication?

In the future, as bad loans become over four years old, more such loans will see a technical write-off. If these loans are not recovered, the centre will have to keep investing money in public sector banks to keep them going. In 2017-18 and 2018-19, it invested ₹2.06 trillion. If rates of recovery of loans written off do not improve, a lot more money will be needed to keep recapitalizing these banks.

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Public sector banks recover Rs 1.2 lakh cr from bad loans in 2018-19

Public sector banks (PSBs) have recovered close to Rs 1.2 lakh crore from stressed assets during the financial ended March, primarily helped by resolution under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), an official said. During the first half of the previous fiscal, banks recovered Rs 60,713 crore from bad loans. "Due to non-resolution of some big accounts referred under NCLT (National Company Law Tribunal), PSBs could not achieve the resolution target of Rs 1.80 lakh crore. But, these accounts should be resolved in the current financial year," the official said.

Banks recovered close to Rs 55,000 crore from the NCLT resolution, the official said. "Compared to Rs 74,562 crore in 2017-18, the recovery in the previous financial year nearly doubled to Rs 1.2 lakh crore," the official said.

Two large accounts of Essar Steel and Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd are still pending to be resolved. It is expected that these two accounts should be resolved in the next few months and recoveries from these could be around Rs 50,000 crore. JSW Steel had revised its offer from Rs 11,000 crore to Rs 18,000 crore and later to over Rs 19,000 crore, whereas Tata Steel's last offer was at Rs 17,000 crore after it had refused to revise its bid. ArcelorMittal has made a bid of Rs 42,000 crore for Essar Steel.

According to the official, consolidation among public sector banks and higher recoveries by state-owned lenders will be on the government's agenda in the current financial year. Referring to the liquidity crisis in the non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), the official said that there are issues with both solvency and liquidity in these companies.
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RBI rap: Yes Bank denies any wrong-doing


Days after RBI pulled up Yes Bank for making a report marked 'confidential' public, the private lender put up a stout defence, saying the NPA divergence information was in due compliance. 

"The bank in its assessment was of the view that the disclosure pertaining to divergence was a UPSI and required prompt dissemination to the Stock Exchanges in order to ensure compliance with Sebi (PIT) Regulations and the NSE & BSE circulars," Yes Bank said in a regulatory filing to the NSE. 

The bank said it divulged the RBI report to ensure information symmetry. 


"Immediately on receipt of the RAR report, to mitigate and to avoid any further speculation, misuse or leakage of the UPSI, it was decided to disseminate the information regarding "Divergence" to the stock exchanges, so as to ensure information parity, instead of withholding this information till finalization of the Annual Results," the bank further stated. 

The bank "has not made any undue advantage or benefit by disseminating the UPSI. Hence, we humbly submit that the bank has not misrepresented or misled the stock exchanges/ investors in terms of Regulation 4(1)(c) of Listing Regulations". 

UPSI stands for Unpublished Price Sensitive Information. 

YES Bank had earlier informed stock exchanges that the RBI has not found any divergence in the asset classification and provisioning done by the lender during 2017-18. 

But RBI has maintained that ‘nil’ divergence is not an achievement to be published and is only compliance with the extant Income Recognition and Asset Classification norms. 


The regulator also pointed out that its Risk Assessment Report (RAR) identified several other lapses and regulatory breaches in various areas of the bank's functioning and the disclosure of just one part of the RAR is viewed as a deliberate attempt to mislead the public. 

However, the RBI’s harsh view of Yes Bank’s move has confused lenders on whether it is a good practice to disclose NPA divergence, even though regulatory guidelines make it compulsory to disclose it in their notes to accounts.  

Source- Economic Times
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Useful tips to recover bad loans/NPA Acs

1.Every branch should maintain a master file having the lists of eligible star sanjeenvani accounts for the year, monthly sascal and NPA borrowers. The Lists should be sorted village wise. While going for recovery, our focus should not to cover many villages, rather to cover a single village and meet with each and every single account of that village coming under the three lists.

2. Ensure to get the mobile phone number of the borrower immediately. If the borrower is not available, then get their family members contact numbers.  Please make a note if there is any landmark near the borrower’s residence. Ensure to update these details in Finacle DC for future purposes.

3.Whosoever is going for recovery, always carry with yourself the below set of things – Mobile number updating forms , L444C or any other loan renewal document , OTS offer letter , Cash deposit and withdrawal challans. This comes easy to deal with borrowers.

4. What I believe that there is no use of visiting the same customer again and again , Identify and try to read his mind during the first visit only  that what type of customer he is and what’s the way to handle him in future like follow up through phone only , regular visits , settlement ,any legal action etc.


5. Whatever is the promises and dates of borrowers, note their words , take their signature and after returning to the branch, update the same in the master file so that whosoever is the next person going for recovery, has some baseline. Also try to know what will be the source of repayment according to the customer. If it is karkhana or any other person, try to contact them also.

6.Whosoever is going for recovery, avoid going inside the house and ensure that the communication should be outside the house only so that the passers and neighborhoods see that the bankers visited that particular household. Some borrowers are very sensitive about their images.

7. At least in a week, use Hacs menu and figure out the credit balances present in the saving account of NPA accounts. Transfer the balances immediately and reduce the NPA figures of your branch.

8. Also on daily basis, before proceeding for day end have a look at the cash vouchers and check if there any recovery in NPA account and parked in the office account . If it is so, immediately appropriate it to the account and reduce the NPA figures of your branch.

9. If at some day you feel that today Karkhana is releasing sugar payments or employees will get salary today and possibly customer can withdraw money from ATM, then at frequent intervals run menu – LADSP (LOAN DEMAND SATISFACTION PROCESS) . This will satisfy the demand raised in the loan account from the saving account of the customer and no need for waiting till day end.

10. As soon as you receive the first sascal list from the controlling office , address the technical sascal first as it will bring down the figures of your list and of course ,lesser will be the pages of sascal, lesser will be our tension.

11. Always understand Time value of money, There are many cases where we unnecessarily wait to get more money and later we lose that money also what we were previously getting. It’s the need of the hour that we cannot wait and increase the age of NPA unnecessarily. Always remember, A stitch in time saves nine.

12.  You can only exercise your power when you know what is your power ?  Modified NPA management policy and Liberal OTS schemes are now available. Be decisive, get the thorough study and utilize it fully.

13. I understand that it’s extremely difficult to initiate legal action for every NPA account. But at least Pick 2,3 strong cases and start the legal action. If it is Sarfaesi , immediately go for 13(2) , pre possession and drag it till the day of paper publication and E auction. Let there will be a fear created amongst the borrowers that we bankers can do everything when it comes to saving our mother institution. If every branch will do at least 2,3 such cases , many NPA borrowers will upgrade their account due to fear . Also publicize your action in such a manner that it will reach in the ear of each and every NPA borrower. Do less Sing more.


14.  Education loan students are very image conscious. When we go to their residence for recovery, often they will be at some other place for job. Try to take out the details of their job and company. After returning, spare some 10-15 minutes and try to figure out the company’s profile by using the social networking. If possible, try to contact them through their official email ids.It will create a fear in them of losing the job as these companies are very conscious of their images .

15. There are many customers of the branches who require regular visits and they wait till the last day and every time they come in sascal, intimate them that whatever the cost involved in the regular visits, bank will recover them from their loan account as follow up charges. Make a note of their visits,take their signature and if possible, recover them also in some cases as follow up/notice charges.

16. At last I would like to say that recovery is a long continuous effort. *Focus should be on recovery not on reporting* . Most of the times , efforts for the day will bear fruits in the next week and possibly credit goes to the person who will visit the borrower on that day . But that should not bother us. After all we all work for the same purpose.

Source-Blog reader
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